A prioricity and qualitatively identical situations 4.3. Kripke and the mind-body problem “I regard the mind-body problem as wide open and extremely confusing”. !��'���������r�3�Z������@R�� ��u♩G�~�1�����Ox�*E~S�jMx���y=�vNaD�5�M��ÞՒn����~bU��=��)�,)���.�J)[U��=��`?6ux���)�.E�UO��cQ�j{���^�?ӻ�FUe�B�~Γ����m[��j�zV�Q����U��*�3��XV���Uq�'���P�~�X�����zyϚ�mM7��Ȇ�j)S�VWU���為'��9(!����!|j ����jlp�Te>2BN��(э��V'^�A8"=���G��V S�l��#��V�֍K#���9�0N�2mw���8I���>�n����h�k���8�L*���\q7����S�W�'t2�B$�k�V�5�~�j�g�6s{��� �$z�e�����Hw�D��B��i#tb2K/�Ɍ�� nAc�)�RiI���~���7&����,4�N�ܖ�������i�b[��M��ɒ�Nqz���q{caN�F�f���1��]�� ؙz)*�����?��EF�"�w��T.�,�����ؚm1������kTf�� Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity consists of revised transcriptions of three lectures given at Princeton University in 1970. � �vk������ݝ9�ݟlH��h��}�D���2E]T�PA6X�.��k�w]��0��ƭ���t� G�@�跴�%R�ɭ�#�Z�Rf�y�a�P1�e��`m��y��a��7 +ĵ�����������z썷׌��N�ҝ1�8P���*N�H^r�#)���?�,�#�J�������X�(dm��\�xdI�o�����ٮ|�bAY[5��2��؛a���K=��Z/b@�*��)u5f�o,�!=�.89'Գ -f�>���c�']$�L�F]���;��PMQ�������(\a\�~�{:`}��'��� ��ʞ�*j|ٺ�"���a؏���y�[]�Ix}���D�j�f�+�N�����y2��A��azD=� ˊJt�\l�c�� %PDF-1.4 2017/2018 /Filter /FlateDecode Book title Naming and Necessity; Author. Q5�p�m0�V/ Sx/j��) \fy f1L%�7�F4aM �X(����f�������_��?�S8��Tƛ���N�nH6Oe��d�UM���F� 9��f%��X�2cQ�H��3���̛�

�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������nfR��@�ރ�o�R!���/�;^���U Ԁ�p��(v;!����j���W�մ���V҆�� Kripke thinks that the similarities between names and kind terms extend beyond their ‘nondescriptionality.’ He further thinks that natural kind terms, like names, are rigid designators. Millianism about names 1. Some sources of skepticism about Kripke’s claim 4.3.1. Naming and Necessity (Saul A. Kripke) University. 1 0 obj<> endobj 2 0 obj<> endobj 4 0 obj<>/ProcSet[/PDF/ImageB]>>/Type/Page>> endobj 5 0 obj<>/Height 8640/Type/XObject>>stream IDENTITY AND NECESSITY 185 think, contrary to most recent theorists, that the reference of names is rarely or almost never fixed by means of description. Kripke-notes - Summary Naming and Necessity. 4.3.2. 4. ?5��o�F�K`2�r~{�H��GB���8=��b_�d���;�P�>X�gD�&&��W��&O��J>g� �Z= T9GT���+���L�g\ye���d^��_9

Course. 3^���v�A�%;s�p���Z���1�+��R�m�c�ThXa�h���7���~M� ��+N5_D�E�Q]:��5����hh�-��Ӑ-��R����A����4?��ކ��Ί:��‚jd�ꛄ�5��ef�(:�,i4".���GW3�i03��իn� �e�>�I=����x1�.�3�s\WgCn�J۶m��!+%�>2_���J�b�X�¸�k�LFpy�$��5���7���Ed���V�;b~�e��#�h ������AHv��a�Zat f���ϴ��J�3F��q�%�. 2 0 obj
�ȋ6�X@��������Ǵ2��9��]f�V�.vG��̷e���Z}D�6��&j��E�X`�5B�j��L%\�`;[��M�1i��^$]H*�Ƨ�s6 ���AD� �8�ن}l��QP?W1����aM�Y%NPx0�]%��hI�,�����3a)��-�+f�9A����޷�`�j��{�n���D��K�^(�F�����H��{�Yf����a?��ܛ�)�8��� Saul A. Kripke. Contingent identities? 5�a�,��yh#��F�Y���-�aZ ����P��it6��fu�[��[,2��J�e�F�1��-����j���6�O��O�7�&�]�v��"�4j4�e��\�&h�������9߄�$@h�h�V60�ږG���`�"�>a�y�VͤT9&r��k�N��T�=��� ���y����^ԛ�v;���-w"4�=�Ng>�ɘC��s}Fj�� The ‘necessity of identity’ is a theorem of quantified modal logic (with identity), but some philosophers nevertheless thought certain examples cast doubt upon the doctrine (see Modal logic ). The necessity of identity 4.2. Having read this in a

The derivation of the necessity of identity in the third Barcan paper is not straightforward, does involve peculiarly modal assumptions (so that it does not go through for T in place of S4), and is altogether different from the derivation (1)-(3) to be found in Wiggins and then Kripke. Saul Kripke (1980/1971) – The Identity Thesis / Excerpt from “Identity and Necessity” Give a sketch of Kripke’s argumentation against the identity theory and discuss it!

stream necessity of identity, which does not. Academic year. StuDocu University. J�MZ�c��W����M�a��e�P��I���r�Ed�o9��f��sځm|�J ��ZCV�(A��%�C4�-����J�>9 k��k�# �D2��V���%B\���0�����~w�`GR�\�Y}Dp��j�@w`zd�6�� ��_e�Wz�&����$�S��r@�:E�Q��[�� ��a 9��WN�o��B=�Y�e�岄�Yώ:%u� ? %PDF-1.3 %���� ��`���3)��۱ķ�j\֖�SzRN�Y3�At���ߋ����W����w�j׮0��+V5"+�p��o8]M2����R��prHY��#��K+��%"��x_�7��5BB�^�)̨rUn�:]A5PG� 蔧��_DX5)=��hR�ݜ��kSb�ԯn �-��~"X�����l���C>$�s3���+�ư�M�� The illusion of contingency 4.3.3. Identity sentences and the necessary a posteriori (97-105) .....7 4.1. x��]]��q}_`�C?ȍHJT0���s��;@`Ⱦ��R7�J��R��;����c[#�d��ԩ���?������Խ��0 o�t���t��/�����^�X���_�~�����!���q������:����~��r{��?v�y%��z%=�$���WR�2t�y-te(�8�.F~��n;w��ڽL�_��C�eh8��n�.�1~�U�q��k^�?/��G���| ��64l �r�!a-��t�R�%(���rUo�+�i,����A����|�w( �2����R� z�_"��gthVt"d�����2 T6 `r � v���*R�� H%q StuDocu Summary Library EN. << /Length 3 0 R �]����VҶ��V��^��A[J�[�i]��[a-��%b�Z��^�������~��:t��N��b�=&�&�t�MՇI� �A� �t��+�����O_M�}]&&�7I���7I�WA>��uoOJ� 4��u[�&��q[���n��� Âi� =�R�v����5"�)���`��������������������������������ڪa�L%-�Z^�qed2ɸ�h"�Ĭ9\�"Je8$"�A�d&�H@2 �C ���x�4,U��)�gڃ+#7+0�� 3�&�)0� �*>q��|?�ã�RL����V_&�S��K����1�f��lʯ��o�7�����C7�H��n�K����R�";����E�oq+%���EQ+ڣ&��+�u����a�ܭ`���1�������')(ROD�R/������!� ��Yi��n�0L0= And by this I do not just mean what Searle says: It's not a single description, but rather >>

%äüöß �2V�f(�Tb��� One of Kripke’s aims is to show that theoretical identity sentences are necessary, if true.
Kripke maintains that identity is a relation that holds between each thing and itself, never holds between any two things, and always holds (or fails to hold) of necessity (see Identity). �B� g�+� B肀Ð�4mH� 뭐�A�A!��`�J¬�0��P��y�U��+b�ȩ�a�"���HPl#��P3�O��� e����, ���S$��o6H$a}�.AqC�2�̛� *�|�y-��VezGK:��rhF����!��>�����>��皵�l!� �Ǯ-��L2�:t�B�5���c�%{�-���;��������99#�2� �a,��ȓ5������>l!�=�>�i��ۘ|�P�y���0T2�6�wg��E�=�3O"Zk5��x��W��� _2s��zsæ���(�n(\u�{�~>�+Fe�E�j(�0�3��k�7���)�?�T�:��k��@c�i9΁d�#����A�u��9��wU�tttV�#�-��C�e!M6���h�Fg�E}]�i@R�������6��Ylp�n]2��헥���+g�R�f"��,���t��O�j�D���Ma�h�LI�5��15[����0X��S�p\G��� ��$�w*���Fqs"(N^a� �!�Z�Q����"ꭳ�D��D �)�l��j��]�Uja�PA�E�Z��2����|�X|����M��F�?�����n��"�çE��7B\��,"�ؾ"b1�5@PF�u ��c����&(l��~PX��7��7��0 ��:�bG� ����@ ����wY%m� 0f